History 29/02/20 Why the Soviet leadership did not trust the scout Sorge
Richard Sorge is most famous for the scout, if not the world, in our country. Biography of scout at times takes on a fantastic part.
the fact that a large part of published about Sorge’s information is rather artistic in nature and not based on archival documents, which, by the way, is still unavailable to the wider public. Because the accuracy of all written reasonably questioned. Unfortunately, today actively replicated a lot of information, which is not confirmed.
this, for example, writes V. M. Chunikhin in the article “Richard Sorge: field notes of a legend” where drew attention to inconsistencies in his biography. Thanks to historian A. G. Fesyun, who published the material “the Case of Richard Sorge. Unknown documents,” became known to many facts that cast doubt on the official biography of Sorge. In fact, the activities of Sorge, as well as any scout-illegal immigrant, generally little is known, and we only know about the two main results of its activities.
First, he warned about the German attack on the Soviet Union, but his messages were ignored. This version is actually based on nothing. Now published reports of Ramsay (online alias Sorge) and they have not only the date. In fact they create more confusion, as one report often contradicts the other. In addition, we know that the German command to mask their plans of attack on the Soviet Union led campaign of disinformation, spreading controversial information through their embassies. And the Embassy in Japan was no exception.
the Most important in the work of Ramsay is that he warned the Soviet leadership that Japan in 1941 did not enter the war with the Soviet Union. It is supposedly allowed in the most difficult moment of the battle for Moscow to transfer from the Far East 26 divISI, which decided the outcome of the battle. However, this statement has two large errors.
first, this applies to transport troops from the Far East. It was deployed 11 divisions, of which half are aimed not at Moscow but in the North-Western sector of the front. Moreover, the transfer of these divisions was carried out from 1 to 11 September, even before Ramsay announced that Japan refuses to attack the USSR. His message to Moscow on 14 September, but the decision itself was made in Japan on 6 September. It is worth noting that the battle for Moscow had not yet begun. Thus, the Soviet command does not weaken its force in the far East. Against 14 divisions, 863 1162 tanks and aircraft of the Kwantung Army in 1941, consisting of two Soviet fronts were 30 divisions and 17 brigades, 6190 2990 tanks and combat aircraft. If in 1942 the Japanese forces in Manchuria has been significantly weakened in connection with the sending of troops to the Pacific theater of war, the Red Army their strength increased. In the summer of 1942 in the far Eastern and TRANS-Baikal fronts already had 34 divisions and 28 brigades. So the data on the composition of troops of the red Army did not confirm that the message Sorge had any impact on the situation.
second, thanks to the published documents it is known that Sorge in Moscow simply did not believe. All of his superiors, Berzin and Uritsky, by the time he was arrested, the majority of scouts-illegal immigrants and spoke often shared the fate of its leadership. Sorge, who refused to go back, causing even more suspicion. According to published A. G. Fesyun documents, all work residency Ramsay in 1937 was stamped “politically defective”, “probably opened by the enemy and under his control.”
And the most recent published data show that the suspicions have been partially substantiated. Sorge, being an ideological supporter of the Comintern, who worked primarily from ideological motives, to the late thirties already completely disappointed in their views. How this affected his work as an intelligence unknown. But it is clear that in such a situation, any information from Sorge could be considered with the opposite sign.
Interestingly, in 1951 the U.S. Congress on the basis of the investigation got into the disposal of the American command, the Japanese documents accused the Soviet Union in pushing Japan to attack the United States. Moreover, in the opinion of Americans, a crucial role was played by just agents Sorge. Of course, in Soviet times, on such charges was responsible only cliches such as: “the USSR is a peaceful country and war can’t.” However, this gave rise to another version of some modern historians. What the Soviet leadership believed the messages Sorge, as he just announced plans of Japan to attack the Soviet Union, but also informed of what the Japanese leadership was going to attack. This model fits well and the American version. If the Soviet leadership did not believe the same information, with the same success could not believe the other. But if Sorge was engaged in setting Japan on the United States on behalf of the leadership, then everything would look different.
But no evidence that the group of Ramsay in Moscow trusted, but there is the opposite. Knowing the structure of the Japanese government and the decision-making system, as well as the Japanese mentality and their attitude towards foreigners, it is difficult to imagine that Sorge could have had at least some influence.
Because all the information on the illegal exploration is still classified, then the conclusion can be only one. All we know about Sorge, cannot be considered completely reliable, and, therefore, the new myths about Ramsay will continue to appear. You just have to treat them carefully.
Cyril Shishkin
Source:
© Russian Seven
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